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Fortunately, there were some bright minds at ESC and MITRE (a federally funded research and development center), in industry, and in the warfighting community. They had been waiting for the opportunity to lash it all together and see what it could do. While far from bringing the entire spectrum of C4ISR technology together, they did make enormous strides in realizing their goal.
By leveraging the assets and talents of the varied organizations, the five temporary battle labs (nicknamed Fort Franklin) and the permanent Command and Control Unified
Battlespace Environment (CUBE) began to reshape the way we harness technology and ideas, and create C4ISR capability. They have also given new insights into conquering the elusive goal of information superiority.
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The philosophy of the battle lab is simple-provide a place where warfighters, developers, and industry can work together. Air Force leadership quickly grasped the value of this team and set out to create six labs. The challenge facing them is how to make it work.
The purpose of this paper is to offer suggestions for developing and implementing the battle labs. It will synthesize the thoughts of visionary leadership and literature to determine the essential elements for success. Failure to address each of these elements will doom the battle lab to becoming another stovepiped process, prime for the chopping block.
The battle lab concept has been successful because of its ability to facilitate cooperation and minimize parochial interests. Hopefully, planners and leaders will use this same philosophy in the creation of the Air Force Battle Lab.
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Abstract
To ensure information superiority for warfighters in the 21st century, the Air Force needs to develop and implement a command and control battle lab. This facility must rapidly integrate new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies, doctrine, and concepts of operations into the joint warfighting arsenal. Air Force leadership has taken a critical first step by defining information superiority as a core competency. The next phase is to determine a strategy for its execution. Our current acquisition system is woefully lacking in its ability to obtain technology. Equally lacking is the warfighter's ability to modify doctrine and organizations to best exploit the technology. A promising solution is the battlefield laboratory, or battle lab. The philosophy of a battle lab is to create a place where warfighters, developers, and industry come together to evaluate, integrate, and apply technology. There are ongoing attempts to create this synergistic trinity, but the optimal combination has not been achieved. This paper will identify the critical elements of a battle lab, propose a prototype structure, and address major obstacles to its success.
Because little has been written on battle lab operations, much of the research material was derived from interviews with visionary military and civilian leaders, and with personnel involved in ongoing battle lab projects. Literature was reviewed from sources such as the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the Advanced Battlespace Information Task
Force.
Introduction Problem Definition
Titanic forces beyond its control are shaking the Department of Defense to its very core. Geopolitical unrest, falling domestic support, mission creep, and rapid commercial technological innovation are severely challenging the ability of military planners, developers, and warriors to adapt. Equally frustrating to the military command structure is the fourth dimension, cyberspace, which is redefining force structure and operations.
How do future warriors gain and sustain information superiority? How do they rapidly obtain and fuse changes in technology with innovative doctrine and tactics? Battle labs may offer the solution.
Since the concept of battle labs is evolving, and current facilities exist in a number of configurations, the definition of "battle lab" is not a simple one. The Air Force has taken a bold step in approving the creation of six battle lab facilities. The challenge is implementing them effectively. This paper will describe factors which have led to the need for battle labs and how they will be used. From interviews with visionaries and reviews of recent literature, it will identify the critical elements for the formation and operations of a battle lab and conclude with a recommended course of action.
Interviews
The following visionaries from the warfighter, developer, and industry communities were interviewed for their insights into battle lab creation: 
Battle Labs
We must get technology to the warfighters in the same generation that it is conceptualized.
-The Honorable Arthur L. Money
Visionaries Leadership
For simplicity, participants in the battle lab process fall into three groups:
Warfighters, developers, and industry. Warfighters create requirements, fund programs, advocate development, and operate the systems. They are responsible for maintenance, operational testing, and the development of doctrine, TTP, and training. Developers conduct research and development, complete source selections and contract award, monitor contract compliance, and deliver the systems. They create the overall logistics plan, conduct developmental testing, and are responsible for technical integration, interoperability, and architecture and standard compliance. Industry has two branches to its operations. In the first, it takes military requirements and creates the most effective system possible while earning a profit for their investors. In the second, it develops new systems to satisfy commercial and government needs without specific direction from either.
Following are the thoughts of leaders from the three communities. While each brings a different perspective to the challenge of fielding capability, they are united in their belief that a battle lab may offer the solution. From the warfighter viewpoint, Gen Redden describes the need for a unifying effort to tie together the joint battlefield. There should be an ability to evaluate new concepts or technology, conduct tradeoffs, and understand the impacts to doctrine, TTP, and current capabilities. He believes a distributed battle lab would enable this unification. 1 According to Gen Franklin, a developer, the battle lab is where warfighters, developers, and industry break down the incompatibility of technology and acquisition timelines. 
A Case Study
This is an unprecedented capability the DOD needs on a permanent basis.
-Admiral William Owens (to the JROC while attending Fort Franklin IV)
The best place to start in identifying critical elements is to examine past efforts.
Perhaps the most successful large scale operation is the Fort Franklin series, and its permanent counterpart, the Command and Control Unified Battlespace Environment (CUBE). Though far from perfect, they offer a framework to build upon.
Fort Franklin Background
The While the cost of the facilities to the taxpayer is negligible, formal funding is mandatory for continuity of the staff and to conduct extensive advanced projects. As Mr.
Gilligan stated, "They (battle labs) are not cheap to operate; we don't want them to drain money away from formal acquisition. There are other places to obtain money from the outside. For instance, the "Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) After
Next" initiative has more money than the entire Theater Battle Management Core Systems 
Creating A Battle Lab
The Battle Lab is a place where operational and development communities come together and leverage off each other's strengths.
-Mr. Gilligan
Thus far this study has expressed the need for battle labs, discussed their uses, and presented a successful case study. This chapter will coalesce the previous discussion to outline the critical elements essential to building a successful battle lab. It will not attempt to draw conclusions but will instead present possible alternatives. The chapter will close with several challenges to overcome in implementing the battle lab effectively. The critical elements for a battle lab are manning, location, operations, and process.
Critical Elements Manning
The battle labs will be a failure if they don't include all the players. Operators, technologists, acquisition, and industry must get in same sand box and overcome the acquisition process by working together.
-Gen Rosenberg
Manning is not necessarily who should be residing in the facility, but who should be active participants and owners of the battle lab. The ABIS task force stated, "Together operational and technical communities are capable of making better judgments than either is alone." Continual interaction creates a smoother transition from concept to implementation, support, and training. It coordinates planning, architecture, integration, and evaluation. Operators focus on CONOPS and training, while R&D looks to enabling technologies and acquisition reform. 1 Not only is it critical to team acquisition and operator personnel, but doctrine and industry representation is equally vital. Gen Redden described the critical need for a partnership with acquisition and for doctrine personnel to lead the organization. 2 Gen
Franklin added that industry is spending millions on marketing that could be better spent working in a battle lab. 
Location
The lab must be distributed. It will become totally irrelevant if it is selfcontained.
-Gen Rosenberg
Location could be a facility, a network of facilities, or a moving target that moves as the concept of technology matures. Generally, the experts agreed the AFBL must leverage the strengths of each organization in a distributed configuration. Gen Redden insisted keeping the labs separate would stovepipe the people and their specialties and would inhibit the creation of comprehensive battlefield models. 5 Gen Nagy echoed these sentiments, stating that four labs directly affect and use information. Integration is essential to prevent stovepiping and achieve the big picture of operations. 6 
Operations
Rank is inversely proportional to innovation.
-ADM Owens and Lt Gen Franklin
Operations is broken into mission, organization, and infrastructure. The operations of a particular node would be dictated by the location's expertise, personnel, and systems.
While most of the interviews and documentation did not get into specifics, they did provide valuable insights on the focus of individual nodes, topcover, and to whom the AFBLs should report.
Mission. The mission of the overall battle lab has been described at length. The mission of the individual nodes would be highly dependent on their area of expertise. Gen Metrics are also mandatory to report success in terms of objectives, goals, timelines, and
Organization. In this area, the interviewees were concerned with insuring the right information made it to the right levels and freedom to experiment prevailed. Gen Franklin, Gen Rosenberg, and ADM Owens all agreed that four-star visibility was required. Gen
Franklin believes the battle lab should report directly to the VCJCS and be responsive to the CINCs. This would give it the ability to reach across the services and be directly in 
Process
Unless there is a forcing function to field capability, they (the battle labs) can become a hobby shop.
-Gen Redden
The final and most difficult element is developing an operating process. The SAB
Vision of Aerospace Command and Control For the 21st Century recommended a spiral
C2 development process which fosters competition and innovations, technology push and requirements pull, and partnership with warfighters, developers, and industry. They suggested streamlining the requirements/funding process by consolidating C2 mission need statements and budgets and developing methods and tools (a development engine) to evaluate new capability. The process must rapidly select technology, field common C2 across the Air Force, and continually evaluate doctrine and TTP. Their mission could be taking the best pieces of industry, laboratories, product centers, and major commands, and putting together an entirely new form of operations center. The new configuration would be tested every year at a future flag exercise. After each yearly iteration it would be modified, thrown out, or improved, and in the fifth year it would be fielded. Why five years? The five year period allows for more continuity and robustness in the operational and technical design, is more economical than revamping operations annually, and provides ample time for budgeting.
It also allows test, logistics, and training tails to keep pace and does not overwhelm warfighters with continual change. The concept is similar to aspects of the JFACC After
Next program. However, it would draw on integrated Air Force talent and leadership, would be an ongoing experiment within the R&D process, and would not cost $100 million a copy!
Obstacles
Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by a majority of decision makers.
-New World Vistas Air and Space Power for the 21st Century
Before concluding, a comment must be made about obstacles to implementation. The most prevalent one is a lack of understanding, leading to fear and oversimplification. By 
Notes
Chapter 5
Recommendations and Conclusion
The final chapter will attempt to synthesize thoughts of interviewees, literature, and personal experience to recommend a course of action. Recommendations are organized under their corresponding critical elements and summarized in Table 1 . That does not mean it would be closely controlling the other nodes. Instead, it would allow the nodes to interoperate among themselves, aid in facilitating cooperation, and be the final operations check prior to fielding. The battle lab network would not be a location but a focus. When a technology or concept is new, the focus may be on a laboratory or industry node. As the experiment develops and matures it may shift to a product center, move to an exercise, or go directly to a field integration site. There should be hundreds of these cooperative experiments ongoing at once.
Operations
Mission. To give some structure and oversight into the process, the C2 AFBL divisions should be broken into their corresponding joint counterpart, i.e., precision engagement, focused logistics, dominant maneuver, and full dimensional protection. The Air Force core competencies and missions are easily rolled into these. This grouping would facilitate cooperation between the services and provide a more joint perspective for operations and for justifying funding of Air Force programs.
Organization. While each node would determine its own structure, organizations should be flat to ensure a free flow of ideas. Bright young talent should be rotated through to bring in fresh ideas, yet maintain currency within their area of expertise.
Finally, the team needs ample topcover, preferably reporting directly to the location's commander.
As for the C2 AFBL, it too needs topcover and empowerment. To maximize visibility and minimize constraints, the AFBL should report directly to the 
Process
The most difficult challenge for the AFBL will be how to integrate into the current system of requirements, development, acquisition, test, support, training, and operations.
Not only is the battle lab portion of the process new, but acquisition and doctrine are experiencing a rebirth. Meshing the processes of development, application, and integration is imperative. The elements in these processes are shown in figure 1. The spiral acquisition process, combined with loosening regulations and a project approval board, appears to be an effective way to rapidly identify, fund, develop, and evaluate projects. It will become the core of the development process. As the new doctrine center stands up, it will become the heart of the applications process. One of its first tasks should be to determine how it would integrate with the acquisition and integration groups. The final process, integration, will be performed by the AFBL.
The AFBL would be fed experiments from the other two processes, while reciprocating with evaluations and additional ideas and technologies. Incentives for the AFBL nodes would come from approval and funding of projects. The approval flow might operate as follows: 1) a technology or concept is identified; 2) a team of affected node experts are "virtually" assembled for an initial evaluation (paper or breadboard); 3) a proposal involving cost, participants, timeline, and metrics is prepared; 4) the proposal is sent to the appropriate group for approval (acquisition board, doctrine board, or vice chief); 5) the experiment is conducted and results sent to the approval authority; 6) the technology or concept is incorporated into ongoing programs, sent back to the AFBL for final wring-out and test, or fielded immediately.
Because of their current integration activities and complimentary C2 assets and missions, a test configuration at the CUBE and 505CCEG should be initiated. These units should receive immediate funding and direction to begin the development of a formal battle lab process. Metrics should be proposed and briefings to the vice chief initiated.
Developmental and operational testers may play a key role in aiding the development of metrics that focus on the big picture of developing and delivering capability. At the same time, AFBL nodes across the Air Force should be established and their connection to the AFBL hub completed.
One of the first AFBL-wide experiments must be the validation of requirements against the C2 infrastructure, as recommended by Gen Franklin. This not only is an excellent vehicle to identify strengths and weakness of current doctrine and systems development but is also an excellent integration exercise for the AFBL. It should also force GCCS compliance and the development of a global C2 architecture and CONOPS.
While the first few yearly iterations of this "requirements experiment" might be miserable failures, they would quickly build into a detailed plan which would be adaptable for the DOD.
Finally, an autonomous team should be formed to assess and redefine air and space operations and determine how to put Global Engagement into the field. This team should be unencumbered by systems development and parochial interests and be provided ample autonomy, empowerment, and funding to draw necessary resources. Led by doctrine innovators, the joint team of warfighters, developers, and industry should report directly to the vice chief of staff. The battle lab process would have to be one of trial and error, but the bottom line is to stop speculating and start trying!
Conclusion
The Department of Defense is at a crossroads never before experienced. Geopolitical upheaval, new missions, declining defense budget, and rapidly changing technology are offering new challenges and opportunities. Information has moved from a tantamount position on the battlefield to a paramount one. The ability of a nation and its military to adapt to technology and use and protect information will dictate its future on the global stage. The C2 AFBL provides the ability to make that rapid adaptation. 
